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1 
IMPROVING THE QUALITY AND CONSISTENCY OF COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS IN MUSIC 
Kristelia A. García† 
In a recent report (the “Report”)1  outlining scholarly concerns about the Copyright Alternatives 
in Small-Claims Enforcement (CASE) Act of 2017,2 a group of law professors submitted comments 
on, among other things, the inquiry “What’s So Special About Copyright?” That portion of the Report 
asks whether there are attributes unique to copyright law such that it should merit a specialized 
tribunal, given the myriad other areas of federal law facing similar enforcement challenges and 
transaction cost concerns.  
Without detracting from the Report’s call for empirical data supporting the potential incentives 
for both defendants and plaintiffs,3 this Comment endeavors to highlight one area in particular that 
arguably distinguishes copyright as unique among the various areas of law calling for a specialized 
tribunal, and also offers a basis for narrowing the jurisdictional scope of such a specialized tribunal (in 
accord with another of the Report’s recommendations): copyright infringement analysis in music. 
Infringement analysis in music is notoriously ill-suited for juries, and prone to intractable distributive 
justice concerns.4 Both of these issues might be mitigated by a specialized tribunal with the authority 
and expertise to avoid some of the pitfalls inherent in the federal litigation process.  
Music is unique among the genres protected by copyright for several reasons, the most significant 
being its dual-copyright structure. Under this structure, every song is protected by two distinct 
copyrights: one on the sound recording, and one on the underlying musical composition. While 
musical compositions have always enjoyed copyright protection, sound recordings were not brought 
under the copyright regime until 1972. Pre-1972 sound recordings are currently governed by state 
law.5  
These idiosyncrasies pose unique and substantial challenges for copyright infringement analysis in 
music. While the terminology varies slightly from circuit to circuit, the substance of copyright 
infringement analysis is generally two-fold: First, there must be evidence of copying, often satisfied 
via demonstration of access. This is followed by a substantial similarity analysis, which considers 
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 1. Pamela Samuelson & Kathryn Hashimoto, Scholarly Concerns About a Proposed Small Copyright Claims Tribunal, 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. COMMENTARIES (Nov. 28, 2017), http://btlj.org/commentaries/scholarly-concerns-about-a-
proposed-small-copyright-claims-tribunal/ [https://perma.cc/A2KV-WTGZ]. 
 2. H.R. 3945, 115th Cong. (2017).  
 3. See also Christian Helmers et al., Who Needs a Copyright Small Claims Court? Evidence from the U.K.’s I.P. Enterprise 
Court, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. COMMENTARIES (Jan. 10, 2018), http://btlj.org/2018/01/who-needs-a-copyright-small-
claims-court-evidence-from-the-u-k-s-i-p-enterprise-court/ [https://perma.cc/9Q94-JGTP] (examining the United 
Kingdom’s copyright small claims court “at least some empirical support for the [U.S.] bill’s implicit assumption that . . . 
a small claims procedure would be . . . particularly impactful for copyright holders.”).  
 4. See, e.g., Mitchell Manger, Blurred Lines Coming Into Focus: Are Juries Qualified to Pass Down Verdicts on Music Copyright 
Infringement Cases?, CORP. COUNS. (Dec. 9, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.law.com/insidecounsel/2015/12/09/blurred-
lines-coming-into-focus-are-juries-qualifi/ [https://perma.cc/DLZ2-3WDH]. 
 5. Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). 
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whether the copying was improper. Both prongs of this analysis suffer deficiencies specific to the 
music context. 
First, a showing of access is easily made by a well-known artist, and nearly impossible to show for 
an unknown artist. For example, in Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, recording artist Michael Bolton was 
accused of infringing The Isley Brothers’ track “Love is a Wonderful Thing” with his track by the 
same name.6 The Isley Brothers are a well-known band, with lots of hits, and plentiful airplay. 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found access on the basis of evidence that the Isley Brothers’ track was 
widely disseminated.7 In Selle v. Gibb, in contrast, Selle, a virtually unknown musician, sued the much 
more popular Bee Gees for allegedly copying his song “Let It End” with their track “How Deep Is 
Your Love?”8 In that case, the district court actually overturned the jury’s finding of infringement on 
the basis of failure to show access (i.e. widespread dissemination), and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.9  
These examples demonstrate how smaller, less popular artists are disproportionately burdened by 
an access standard that effectively requires widespread dissemination. The role of a small claims 
copyright tribunal as a repeat player in music infringement cases affords it the unique opportunity to 
develop expertise in assessing access, including the opportunity to establish internal procedures for so 
doing that extend beyond mere dissemination. To the extent such expertise can lead to increased 
enforcement opportunities for less well-known artists, a specialized tribunal aligns with the incentive 
theory of copyright. 
As a question of fact, the second step in copyright infringement analysis in music—substantial 
similarity analysis—considers the impropriety of the copying by application of a subjective, “lay 
listener” standard.10 Herein lies the first problem with substantial similarity analysis in music: Jurors 
can listen to a sound recording, but they can’t listen to a musical composition. Where an infringement 
claim alleges copying from a musical composition—or involves a pre-1972 sound recording (for which 
only compositions were accepted for registration)—it requires a jury to instead consider sheet music 
(or, in its absence, some kind of substitute, such as a lead sheet).  
Because jurors cannot be assumed to read music, much less interpret similarities in musical 
notation, experts are typically engaged to opine on highly technical points of complicated music 
theory. In many cases, the matter devolves into a battle of the experts, with each side’s musicologist 
attesting to the similarities, or lack thereof, between the compositions (or lead sheets, as the case may 
be). As a result, recent litigation in the area has seen astronomical verdicts,11 irreconcilable outcomes,12 
and a propensity toward settlement,13 which in many cases may reflect nothing more than rights 
accretion.  
                                                      
 6. 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 7. Id. at 483. 
 8. 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 9. Id. at 902–03.  
 10. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (“The question, therefore, is whether defendant 
took from plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners . . . that defendant wrongfully 
appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LACV1306004JAKAGRX, 2015 WL 4479500, at *26, *29, *45 
(C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015) (remitting award of actual damages from $4 million to $3,188,527.50 and award of profits from 
$1,610,455.31 to $357,630.96, plus fifty percent of ongoing publishing royalties).  
 12. Compare, e.g., Williams, 2015 WL 4479500, at *33 (finding of infringement resulting from a battle of the experts), 
with Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. CV153462RGKAGRX, 2016 WL 1442461, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016) (finding 
of no infringement). 
 13. See, e.g., Daniel Kreps, Tom Petty on Sam Smith Settlement: ‘No Hard Feelings. These Things Happen’, ROLLING STONE 




In other highly technical areas of the law, specialized tribunals mitigate this problem. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, for example, serves as the only appellate-level federal court 
with the authority to hear patent and trademark case appeals.14 This specialization has afforded the 
Federal Circuit the opportunity to develop an expertise in these subjects, enabling it to handle highly 
technical disputes.15 A small claims court for copyright might likewise develop an expertise in 
conducting substantial similarity analyses in music cases, thereby reducing both the cost of litigation—
after all, experts are expensive—and improving the predictability of outcomes (something sorely 
missing at present). If the jurisdictional scope of the proposed copyright small claims court were 
ultimately narrowed to only music infringement claims, the potential for specialization would increase 
accordingly, and may even justify a call for its judges to be trained in musicology.  
Assuming participation in any small claims copyright tribunal would be voluntary, there should be 
no Seventh Amendment concern, and no foreclosure of the federal right to an appeal. This assumes, 
of course, that the proposed opt-out regime passes constitutional muster, a conclusion that the Report 
raises serious doubts about.16 In an ideal world, the tribunal’s rulings would have declaratory effect; if 
not by law, perhaps by evolving industry norms and customs. This is especially likely in music 
infringement litigation, where claims are often brought as an impetus to settlement, and could have 
the desired effect of making outcomes more predictable on the whole.  
A second challenge that might be ameliorated by a specialized copyright tribunal is copyright 
litigation’s tendency to privilege musical works over musical recordings, and copyright law’s failure to 
internalize borrowing norms and customs prevalent in certain genres.17 Both of these practices 
potentially disadvantage a diverse set of musicians. Unlike classical music, genres such as jazz and 
rhythm-and-blues are often composed and recorded simultaneously, without formal musical notation. 
For pre-1972 sound recordings in these and related genres, a “lead sheet,” or third-party transcription 
of a recorded track, was often submitted for registration in lieu of a composition. Contemporary sound 
recordings in these and related genres—including rock and hip hop—often adopt a similar practice in 
order to establish a right to publishing royalties.  
The problem here is that a lead sheet rarely (if ever) encompasses the entirety of a composition. 
In many cases, a lead sheet will fail to include multiple creative contributions reflected in the sound 
recording.18 In some cases, lead sheet deposits have been determined to be poor or flat-out inaccurate 
representations of the sound recording.19 The ambiguity inherent in even the best of lead sheets 
affords well-paid experts wide latitude in which to interpret in their client’s favor, while simultaneously 
denying some artists the ability to fully articulate, or defend against, an infringement claim. A 
                                                      
 14. U.S. CONST. art. III. See also generally Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Understanding the Federal Circuit: An Expert Community 
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of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). 
 15. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment Specialization, 54 CAS. W. RES. L. REV. 769, 
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 16. Samuelson & Hashimoto, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 17. See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 
N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006).  
 18. Charles Cronin, I Hear America Suing: Music Copyright Infringement in the Era of Electronic Sound, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 
1187, 1230 & n.227 (2015) (describing how lead sheets are generally poor reflections of the full range of a musical work). 
 19. Id. at 1230 n.228 (explaining that in the context of litigation over Marvin Gaye’s music, “[t]he melodic scraps 
sung above these elements were inserted haphazardly [on the lead sheet] following the words, as reflected in the 
transcriber’s constant resorting to tie markings to create an intelligible visual rendering of music that was never intended 
to be captured in this manner.”). 
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specialized tribunal could ameliorate this difficulty by potentially eliminating the call for experts, and 
by developing a proficiency in interpreting and weighing the probativity of lead sheets.  
Similarly, artists in genres with a history and culture of borrowing and sharing often have a difficult 
time making their case under the current regime, where copyright infringement suits are spread across 
courts around the country. A specialized tribunal would be able to hear many, if not most, of these 
cases, making it easier for a consensus around sharing norms to emerge and be considered.  
A final musical quirk deserves mention: Under the § 115 compulsory license20—commonly known 
as the “cover song license”—a songwriter is obligated to license her composition for recording by a 
statutory licensor, so long as that licensor complies with the statutory requirements and pays the 
statutory rate. There are limited consequences, however, for a licensor who fails to do so—either by 
serving a deficient notice or no notice at all, or by failure to pay. Very few individual songwriters can 
afford to bring a lawsuit against a deadbeat licensor. A dedicated copyright tribunal could provide just 
such a forum. In addition, a specialized tribunal is in an ideal position to maintain and publish a list of 
repeat offenders. This alone could do substantial work in the way of correcting misbehavior in an 
industry that often relies on reputation and repeat interaction.  
The concerns described herein all highlight music’s idiosyncratic position in copyright. The 
complex nature of copyright in music leaves it particularly susceptible to manipulative litigation tactics, 
and the distributive justice concerns borne thereof. A specialized tribunal focused on copyright 
infringement analysis in music could develop a subject matter expertise that would mitigate those 
issues and introduce much-needed predictability to an otherwise cumbersome and unwieldy process.  
 
                                                      
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012). 
